This article constructs measures of multi factor productivity (MFP) 
introduCtion
The Medicare Economic Index (MEI) is one component that contributes to the yearly update of the Medicare physician fee schedule and is intended to measure yearto-year changes in input prices faced by physicians. The MEI is adjusted for MFP to avoid double counting gains in earnings that result from growth in productivity. Without this adjustment, the MEI would be based only on the inputs used in pro viding services (input prices, volume, and intensity of services) and would not reflect increases in the efficiency with which those services could be provided.
The author is an independent consultant. The statements in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the author or the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).
BLS publishes productivity estimates for various industries, however; there is no readily accessible measure that is specific to physicians' offices. As a result, CMS, the agency responsible for the construc tion of the updates, uses an economywide measure of MFP from the private non-farm business sector as a proxy for physicians' MFP. To determine if this economywide MFP index represents the best available proxy for use in the MEI, this study con structs alternative estimates of MFP for physicians' offices.
MetHodology
This research begins with the MFP methodology used by BLS (1997) for other industries, but deviates from that method when necessary. The underlying economic theory of production leads to the deriva tion of a logarithmic formula for a techni cal change index as the residual that is left when the effects on output from specific inputs are netted out: MFP= where:
A t = multifactor productivity in time t Q t = quantity of output in time t K t = quantity of capital input in time t L t = quantity of labor input in time t IP t = quantity of intermediate in put in time t w k, w l, w ip = cost share weights for the inputs According to this model, the logarithm of the change in MFP is represented by the logarithm of changes in real output, less logarithms of changes in capital, real inputs for labor, and intermediate inputs (goods and services purchased by an industry from other industries). Cost shares for each input are computed from observed input price and quantity data. The cost share weights appearing in the technical change formula used by BLS are the means of the cost shares for each input computed in two adjoining periods:
where: P i,t = price of input i in period t x i,t = quantity of input i, in period t i = K, L, IP
Results from this study are dictated by both the MFP methodology and the strength of available data. Oftentimes, approximations are required because the physicians' office industry is marked by a lack of information from sources typically used to construct MFP for other industries. Another deviation from the MFP meth odology used by BLS for other industries includes the absence of the use of labor hours to account for changes in labor qual ity. Labor hours in the BLS formulation are not homogeneous, as these hours are a function of skill mix which varies among industries and across time within indus tries. To deal with this, BLS and others within the research community, specifi cally Jorgenson, Mun, and Stiroh (2005) , use variations in worker characteristics to construct indexes that reflect differences in labor quality. Unfortunately, information required to construct a skill mix index for physicians' offices is not available.
This model further departs from BLS methodology with respect to opportunity costs of self-employed persons, a signifi cant portion of total physician office per sonnel. BLS treats labor compensation paid to a self-employed person as equal to the labor compensation for an employee in the same industry and in the same age/ sex/educational attainment class. For ex ample, a female self-employed physician is assigned compensation equal to a female physicians' office employee in the same age range with an educational level more than a college degree. This attaches an opportunity cost to physicians that is sub stantially lower than what is consistent with actual educational attainment and experi ence. This model abandons this procedure for an alternative that includes separate labor compensation estimates for physi cians and for non-physician employees in physicians' offices.
In order to merge data for input catego ries into an input index, the BLS methodol ogy uses 2-year moving averages of annual weights. These are applied to logarithms of changes in input quantities. However, in this model an input index is derived by applying annual weights to changes in input quantities, because it is simpler to explain and there are no significant differences in results.
To highlight key trends in average annual rates, this study is divided into three periods : 1983-1992, 1993-2000, and 2001-2004 (Figure 1 ).
The article begins by constructing an index for the quantity of inputs followed by how the indexes for quantities of outputs are created, and how the output and input indexes are merged to provide an estimate of physicians' office MFP. Then that is com pared to economywide MFP and various conclusions are offered. 
PHysiCians' oFFiCe inPut index
The physicians' office input index in cludes both cost shares and changes in quantities for each major category of input. To establish cost shares, physicians' office expenditures are organized into income statement form to identify major expense categories. This income statement consists of three areas:
(1) Non-physician employee labor com pensation expenditures, labor com pensation rates, and quantities of labor hours. 
annual work-Hours and labor Compensation
Annual work-hours of non-physician employees are the product of the number of employees, their average work-hours per week, and their average annual work weeks. Annual labor compensation is the product of annual work-hours, and aver age earnings and fringe benefits per hour (Table 1) . Outpatient surgical and health maintenance organization centers are included with physicians' offices because these categories are grouped with physi cian expenditures in the Bureau of Eco nomic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Accounts.
The production worker grouping in the BLS Current Employment Survey (CES) includes the number of non-physician, non-supervisory employees in physi cians' offices. Although BLS states that an unknown number of these production workers may be employed physicians who are not corporate officers or who have no supervisory responsibility, their number is small. Further, the BLS Occupational Employment Survey points out that by omitting employed physicians, aver age earnings per hour for non-physician employees is roughly the same as those for production workers in the CES. The CES also publishes average hours per week and average earnings per hour for production workers (Table 1) .
Data for the number of non-physician employees in physicians' offices are also available from the Decennial Census for 1980, 1990, and 2000 , the Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) for [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] , and the Current Population Survey (CPS) for all years through 1993. The Decennial Census and the ACS data are very similar to the CES data; however the CPS data contains considerably fewer non-physician employees. The CES data is the preferred source, because it is cor roborated by the Decennial Census data, is more timely, and is stable.
The CES also reports from the North American Industry Classification System the number of outpatient surgical and health maintenance organization cen ter employees, but excludes the number of production workers, work-hours, and earnings. Therefore, data for the number of production workers are based on the proportion of employees who are produc tion workers in physicians' offices. In addi tion, in the previously mentioned centers, average hours per week and earnings per hour are based on data for non-mental health outpatient facilities (Table 1) . Aver age annual work weeks for non-physician employees are reported in the CPS.
Data for fringe benefits per hour are not available for physicians' offices. Therefore, ratios of fringe benefits to hourly earnings from the BLS Employer Cost for Employee Compensation Survey are used to compute fringe benefits. The survey also reports employer costs for earnings and fringe benefits for all health services and hospi tals, though not for physicians' offices. In estimating fringe benefits for physicians' offices, an employment-weighted estimate of hospital's contribution is backed out of the total. Although the remaining residual includes data specific to both ambulatory care and nursing homes, it is the closest wage supplement available. These data are then merged to form annual work hour and labor compensation estimates for non-physician employees. Annual work hours estimate the labor input. Labor compensation is used to compute the non-physician weight. Refer to footnotes at the end of the table. Recently, as average compensation for non-physician employees accelerated, nonphysician employees' annual hours decel erated. Beginning in the early 1990s, the share of total expenditures accounted for by non-physician employee compensation increased steadily from 18.2 percent in 1987 to a peak of 25.2 percent in 2000. This share began to decline around 2001.
depreciation and Business taxes
Reliable historical depreciation data for physicians' offices are not available. Instead, for ambulatory health services depreciation data from BEA are utilized. Physicians' office spending represents approximately one-half of ambulatory health services spending. Physicians' office depreciation then is the ratio of depreciation to gross output for ambula tory health services, multiplied by phy sicians' office spending. Business taxes are estimated from BEA's gross domestic product by industry series for ambulatory health services.
Physician income and intermediate input expenses
Physicians' office input costs not only include non-physician labor compensation, depreciation, and business taxes, but inter mediate expenses and physicians' income, as well. Intermediate expenses, plus physi cians' income form the residual. 1 Interme diate inputs consist of goods and services purchased from other industries. These include medical non-durables, such as syringes. Physician income has two com ponents: (1) labor compensation for work performed and (2) returns on physicians' office equity.
Unfortunately, no time series exists for intermediate input costs or physicians' income. To construct this time series, data for the number of physicians and their work-hours are merged with physicians' average annual income and data for physi cians' office intermediate input costs. Phy sician work-hours are the product of the number of office-based physicians, average hours per week, and average work weeks per year (Table 2 ). There is no official gov ernment source for the number of officebased physicians, therefore the annual allopathic and osteopathic physician cen suses by the American Medical Associa tion (AMA) and the American Association of Colleges of Osteopathic Medicine are used. Annual physician work-hours are computed from CPS data for weeks worked and hours worked per week. Annual workhours computed from these data are similar to AMA estimates for overlapping years (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) .
Physician average weekly hours re mained fairly steady through the 1980s and early 1990s. After reaching a peak of nearly 55.7 hours in 2001, hours per week dropped to an average of 51.5. Despite this, annual work weeks remained steady, leading to a decline in annual hours. A recent study by Tu and Ginsburg (2006) and annual surveys conducted by Medical Economics (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) Physician income as a percent of total physician office expenditures for 1995, 1999, and 2003 Physician income consists of labor com pensation (which is the opportunity cost of physician labor) and ROE. The data do not distinguish between the two. This ambiguity is reflected in the Internal Rev enue Service's (2006) Statistics of Income data, which shows net profits vary sub stantially by physicians' office's legal ar rangement whereby a portion of sole proprietor and partnership net income is reported by physicians as labor compensa tion rather than ROE. Similarly, business income (distinguished from wage income) as reported in the Decennial Census, the ACS, and the CPS, is not separated into labor compensation and ROE.
Here, we split physician income into labor compensation and ROE. Theoreti cally, all corporate physicians should be paid wages commensurate with their con tributions to marginal product as physi cians or corporate officers. Thus, any corporate net profit represents ROE. The same ROE rate is assumed for sole propri etors and partnerships. This rate is applied to physician income, thus separating phy sician income into labor compensation and ROE. Physician labor compensation is used later to compute the physician por tion of the labor input cost share. Similarly, ROE, along with depreciation, is used to compute the capital services weight. Undoubtedly, this ROE measure is impre cise. An alternative method equates physi cian labor compensation with the average compensation for their employees in the same demographic class. Unfortunately, this measure assigns far too little opportu nity costs to physicians and far too much to ROE. Neither method is without fault, but the former is less problematic.
Throughout the 1980s, physician labor compensation (their opportunity costs) as a proportion of physicians' office reve nues remained fairly stable. Since the early 1990s, however, physicians took home an ever-shrinking portion of office revenues, dropping from 45.1 percent in 1992 to 33.0 percent in 2004. This is reflected in the deceleration of labor compensation rates since 1992. As a percent of office revenues, ROE grew slowly throughout the mid-1990s, a trend that continued into the 2000s.
Intermediate inputs make up the other part of the residual. Intermediate input expenses as a share of physician office revenues, though stable during the earlier periods, has increased markedly beginning in 2001. This was primarily due to increases in quantities of intermediate inputs (Figure 2) .
The story that emerges is that fluc tuations in annual physician incomes and physician labor compensation per hour result from a combination of factors. First, the deceleration in physician revenues, coupled with a smaller deceleration in expenses forced physicians to absorb most of the drop in office revenues during the early 1990s. Second, labor hourly compen sation rates for non-physician employees and intermediate input prices decelerated slightly after 1992 as well, but not nearly as much as physician labor compensa tion rates. Third, after 1999, non-physician employee compensation rates acceler ated slightly, but intermediate input price changes increased somewhat as physician incomes and labor compensation rates grew along with physician office revenues.
Capital ser vices and rental rates
Capital stocks, represented by build ings and equipment, and the annual ser vices from which they flow (or equivalently depreciation), are another input in the pro duction of physician services. Ideally, an MFP calculation would include an index for capital services of constant quality (Jorgenson, Mun, and Stiroh, 2005) . The flow of capital services during the year is assumed to be proportional to the average of current and lagged capital stock (Jor genson, Mun, and Stiroh, 2005) . Thus, an estimate of physicians' office MFP would ideally contain a constant-quality, 2-year moving average of capital stock. Unfor tunately, a constant-quality measure is not available. A proxy for changes in physicians' office capital stock is changes in the ambulatory health services sector indexes for struc tures and equipment. These are found in the BEA fixed-asset data. Changes in capi tal stock represent changes in capital ser vices, without accounting for any lagged effect of changes in capital stock on capi tal services; a procedure which may intro duce some error in the growth of capital services in the MFP calculation. However, whatever error may exist is minimized by the relatively small weight associated with capital service growth. In the BLS MFP formulation, the cost share for capital services is not included in physician and non-physician employee labor compen sation, intermediate input expenditures, and business taxes. The capital services cost share is the sum of ROE and depre ciation. Changes in the capital service rental rate are represented by changes in the total capital service rentals divided by changes in the quantity of capital services. It is possible that growth estimates in physicians' office capital services may be underestimated substantially due to large, but unknown, capital services made avail able by institutions, particularly hospitals, which do not appear as expense items in physicians' office ledgers. 2 Capital service rentals as a proportion of physician office revenue, stable for many years, increased sharply beginning in 1998. This is primarily a result of rapidly increas ing capital rental rates per unit of capital (Figure 3) .
total input expenditures, Quantities, and Prices
Total input costs is the sum of the vari ous input costs as previously described. The cost shares for the major inputs are computed by converting each to dollars (Table 4) . Capital services are represented by ROE and depreciation. To simplify com putations, annual weighted averages of the inputs are used in place of the Tornqvist weighted MFP formulation used by BLS. Cost shares are multiplied by their respec tive inputs and summed to obtain a rate of change in total inputs. A similar compu tation for input prices yields changes in total input prices. These calculations show rapid accelerations in both input prices and quantities for 1983-1992, followed by rapid deceleration for input prices and moder ate deceleration for input quantities over 1993 -2000 . For 2001 -2004 , input prices and quantities resumed their acceleration, at average annual rates of 4.2 and 4.3 percent, respectively (Figure 4 ).
output expenditures, Prices, and Quantities
The quantity of physicians' office out puts is derived by deflating physicians' office revenue using an appropriate trans action price index. The only existing price Table 4 Physician measures for physicians' offices are the BLS producer price inconsumer price index (CPI). The PPI is a transaction price index that presents prices after deductions for discounts. A published rate of change in the PPI was first made available in 1998. The CPI is a list price that portrays prices before deductions for discounts and is available for all study years. Because the CPI overstates the growth in actual prices, it understates the growth in the quan tity of outputs when used as a deflator. Therefore, a backcasted PPI is required for periods prior to 1998. Two methods of backcasting the PPI are presented here. In the first, a discount history is constructed for industrywide physician services. The discount history is then applied to the CPI for physicians to construct a transaction price, or essen tially a PPI for physicians. The second method uses Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) data on the ratio of Medicare prices to private health insur ance prices to construct a Medicare-private health insurance price index. This index is used to backcast the PPI for periods before 1998.
Backcasted PPi alternative 1
To convert historic CPIs into a transac tion price index similar to the PPI, an allow ance rate history (one, minus the discount rate) for general population physician bill ings is needed. Although an allowance rate history exists for Medicare physician billings, none is available for the general population billings. To approximate such a history, a Medicare allowance history is constructed from Medicare Part B carrier workload reports. Based on this, a discount history for the general population is cre ated based on the following assumptions:
• The general population allowance rate was the same as Medicare's at the ear , 1975 and 1996 , and by the derivative of the Medicare curve. The general population allowance rates were then merged with the physicians' CPI to obtain a deflated transaction price index for physicians. The data show Medicare began to diverge significantly from the industrywide curve in the early 1980s.
To backcast the PPI from 1996, the National Income and Product Accounts transition change for 1997, and the PPI for 1998 forward were used to deflate physi cian expenditures. Results show output decelerated during 1993-2000. The period after 2000 exhibits a rapid acceleration in output.
Backcasted PPi alternative 2
Direct Research, LLC (2003) publishes a combined Medicare-private health insur ance index, which is the ratio of the Medi care fee-for-service (FFS) payment rate to the private health insurance payment rate. This ratio is available for all years 1989 2004, with the exception of 1997 and 1998, which are interpolated (Table 5) . To create this combined price, the rate of change in Medicare FFS prices (Table  5) is first divided by the rate of change in the MedPAC ratio for Medicare prices to private health insurance prices. This yields a rate of change in private health insurance prices. The rates of change in Medicare and private health insurance prices are then weighted by their respective expendi tures, found in the National Health Expen diture Accounts. The result represents a rate of change in combined Medicareprivate health insurance prices.
Although the Medicare-private health insurance index does not entirely reflect the total physician payment universe, it still appears to be the main driver of changes to the PPI. The high correlation coefficient between the index and the PPI for 1998-2004 (r = 0.93) justifies using a regression line to backcast the PPI rate of change to 1990 (Table 5) . Much like Alter native 1, the results show a deceleration in the quantity of outputs during 1993-2000, followed by a rapid acceleration beginning in 2001 . For 1990 -2004 , changes in the quantity of outputs are about the same for the two alternative prices, but are greater than the changes in the CPI. Despite their similari ties, the quantities of output generated by the two alternative PPIs differ in some respects. Alternative 1's comparatively higher prices generate smaller rates of output change than Alternative 2's prior to 1993, but their slightly lower prices produce somewhat higher rates of output change for 1993-2000. In all periods, the rates of change in the ratio of Medicare fees to this constructed PPI and the rates of change in the ratio of Medicare fees to private health insurance fees are similar. (Shatto, 2006) . Some economists (Triplett and Bos worth, 2004; Cutler, 2001 ) reject health sector price measures produced by BLS because they are measured in producer prices rather than prices which reflect changes in health care quality (Nord haus, 2005) . This article does not account for quality changes because comparisons between physician and general economy MFP are required for evaluating the MEI and general economy MFP data from BLS use producer prices, not quality adjusted prices.
Physician office MFP
The percentage change in real outputs not explained by the percentage change in real inputs represents the growth in phy sicians' office MFP. The approximations offered in this exploratory analysis indi cate that from 1983-1992, average growth in physicians' office MFP (1.5 percent) grew somewhat more quickly than econo mywide MFP (1.2 percent). Beginning in 1993 and continuing through 2000, a period often referred to as the managed care era, physicians' office MFP averaged negative annual growth at -0.6 percent; considerably lower than the 0.9 percent growth observed in the private non-farm business sector. Finally, from 2001 up through and includ ing 2004, average annual growth in physi cians' office MFP was just two-tenths of a percentage point lower than economywide growth (1.7 versus 1.9, respectively).
It is important to note that the preced ing analysis represents a good faith effort to approximate annual growth rates in physicians' office MFP and compare those estimates to the economywide measure currently used to adjust the MEI. Due to data limitations throughout the estima tion process, many assumptions were incorporated and various proxies were used. Consequently, the results presented here are not suitable for use in adjusting actual payments.
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